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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
~VALTER

H. RUF,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
~SSOCIATION

FOR WORLD TRAVEL EXCHANGE and JAMES F.
KENNY,

Case No.
9114

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are not complicated.
The only question for consideration is whether the
vidence supports the verdict as to the extent of damages.
~he defendants, driving North on 4th East Street, ran
hrough a stop sign and hit the automobile of the plaintiff
roadside (R. 50, 62, 63, 108). The plaintiff's automobile
ras thrown a distance of about 34 feet by the impact (R.
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60) . The plaintiff was thrown from the automobile, lanj
ing on his back (R. 71-72).
No error has been assigned by the defendants relatiiJ
to the issue of liability. The alleged error goes solely to tl
issue of damages.
Although the nature and extent of the damages a1
shown in detail in the transcript, they can be summarize
briefly. Prior to the accident, plaintiff was in good healt
(R. 79). He had no pain or disability (R. 79, 80). Hew~
an experienced typewriter and office equipment salesma
(R. 78, 80). Plaintiff has continued to suffer pain an
disability from the time of the accident (R. 74-80). Plair
tiff is required to wear a steel back brace (R. 74-75). H
is unable to perform his work as a typewriter and offic
equipment salesman ( R. 77-78) . After treatment for se\
eral months, his doctor, Dr. William S. Allred, prescribe
a spinal fusion operation (R. 142). This operation woul,
result in the fusion of two vertebrae, causing a limitatio
of motion but relieving pain (R. 142). Dr. Allred believe
that a spinal fusion operation would result in improvemeiJ
to plaintiff's back (R. 142). Plaintiff's earnings prior t
the accident were between $450.00 and $500.00 per mont:
(R. 82, 83, 84). Plaintiff's earnings dropped each mont:
after the accident (R. 85). His earnings in October, 195
were $319.05 (R. 86). In February, 1959 he earned $220.0
(R. 86). From the end of February through April, he mad
approximately $150.00 (R. 86).
The jury verdict was in the amount of $1,344.57 speci~
damages and $20,000.00 general damages.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE; SAID
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE VERDICT IS NOT EXCESSIVE; SAID
VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendants' recital of the facts is fragmentary; it
:ails to give the Court a true and complete understanding
>f the substantial evidence which supports the verdict.
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Evidently the defendants' argument is that the plaii
tiff sustained no injury as a result of the accident. On pag
10 of the defendants' brief, the statement is made: "Ac
mittedly, the man required a spinal fusion operation t
repair the degenerative disease that pre-dated the accideiJ
and which was in no way related to the accident by causG
tion or aggravation."
The italicized statement is contrary to the evidencE
The plaintiff testified that he had had good health prio
to the accident (R. 79). The only trouble that he had h3i
was a minor back ailment in April, 1953 (R. 79). This ail
ment was· corrected and never bothered him (R. 79). PlaiiJ
tiff had sustained no injuries in his lifetime (R. 79). H
had never been in another accident (R. 80). He had neve
been hospitalized before the accident (R. 80). Immediatel
prior to the accident, plaintiff was active and energetic (R
98, 102, 124) and engaged in gainful employment for th
Schreyer Typewriter Company (R. 80). Plaintiff testifiet
that following the accident, he had constant pain and ten
derness in his back (R. 72, 73, 74, 75). This evidence i
undisputed.
The witnesses, Evelyn Maria Ruf Smith, Franz Schreyer
John Ashworth Thompson, and Margie Vivian Angell al
testified that plaintiff appeared in good physical conditioJ
prior to the time of the accident and did not manifest an:
pain or difficulty in performing his livelihood (R. 98, 100
102, 124, 153, 154). The witnesses, Evelyn Maria Ru
Smith, Margie Vivian Angell, and Franz Schreyer testifie
that after the accident plaintiff appeared unable to perforn
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the usual functions without difficulty (R. 97-99, 100-103,
124, 125). This evidence is undisputed.
Dr. William S. Allred examined the plaintiff after the
accident and on numerous other occasions and treated plaintiff during the period prior to the trial (R. 139-147). Dr.
Allred is an orthopedic specialist (R. 137). Dr. Allred testified that the accident of September 5, 1958 precipitated
the symptoms of which the plaintiff complains (R. 143).
Dr. Allred testified that it was not uncommon for persons
to have a narrowing of an intervertebral space without experiencing pain (R. 143, 151). Dr. Allred testified that the
plaintiff was, in his opinion, unable to continue carrying
typewriters or other heavy equipment (R. 147). Dr. Allred
recommended a spinal fusion operation (R. 142). The
Doctor felt that with a spinal fusion operation, plaintiff
could expect some improvement in the condition of his back
(R. 142). However, the Doctor observed that the spinal
fusion operation would result in some limitation of motion
due to the fusion of vertebrae (R. 142).
Defendants' witness, Dr. Paul Milligan, admitted on
cross-examination that he had found limitation of motion
which was visible in his examination of plaintiff's back
(R. 169); that a violent throw from an automobile with
a man landing on his back could, and in fact did, cause some
disintegration of the intervertebral disc (R. 171). Dr.
Milligan also testified that he had every reason to believe
what plaintiff had told him with respect to having pain in
his back (R. 171). Dr. Milligan admitted that the accident
was, or might have been, the precipitating cause of the
symptoms of which plaintiff complains (R. 173). There..
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fore, both n1edical witnesses testified, in substance and
effect, that the accident was probably the precipitating
cause of plaintiff's disability, pain and suffering.
No contention is made by the plaintiff that he is entitled to recover for a pre-existing physical condition. However, plaintiff is entitled to recover for the aggravation,
resulting in disability, pain and suffering, of a condition
which caused no disability or pain prior to the accident.
The evidence in this case supports the finding, or for that
matter establishes without dispute, that plaintiff's disability, pain and suffering were caused or precipitated by
the negligence of the defendants.
Furthermore, the evidence supports the finding by the
jury as to the extent of the damages. Plaintiff is entitled
to recover for any and all damages proximately resulting
from the defendants' negligence, including pain and suffering, past and future, loss of earnings, and other elements,
as specifically set forth in the Court's Instruction No. 8 to
the jury. The jury was instructed that it could not speculate as to the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries, and
should compensate plaintiff only for those injuries which
it found from a preponderance of the evidence were directly and proximately a result of the accident. It must be
assumed that the jury read, understood and followed the
instructions.
The evidence establishes that the plaintiff was, prior
to the accident, able to perform the work of a typewriter
and office equipment salesman (R. 79); that the plaintiff
was capable of earning, and had earned between $450.00
and $500.00 per month in the said line of work (R. 82, 83,
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84) . The evidence shows that the· plaintiff was not able
to perform the duties of an office equipment and typewriter
salesman after the accident (R. 77, 98, 103, 125, 142).
Plaintiff's earnings after the accident did not exceed
$319.05 per month (R. 86). Plaintiff was fifty-four years
of age at the time of the accident (R. 66). The medical
witnesses, as well as the plaintiff, confirmed the fact that
plaintiff suffered pain after the accident (R. 142, 171).
The effect of a spinal fusion operation would be to fuse the
vertebrae, causing a permanent limitation of motion in the
lower back (R. 142).
In summary, there was substantial evidence from which
the jury could find damages in an amount equal to or in
excess of the verdict.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL.
The defendants treat Points I and II together for purposes of argument. The statement is made that they relate
to the same propositions. It is evident that there is no basis
set forth in the defendants' brief or otherwise for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Although a verdict which is unsupported by the evidence, or
a verdict resulting from passion and prejudice of the jury
might entitle a party to a new trial, there is no showing in
this case either that the verdict is unsupported by the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dence or that the verdict was a result of passion and prejudice.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
Defendants contend that Instruction No. 9 is erroneQus
in that it permits the jury to speculate as to the loss of earning capacity of the plaintiff. Defendants state that there
is no evidence, documentary or otherwise, concerning plaintiff's life expectancy or for the period in which he might
be gainfully employed. A reading of the entire context of
Instruction No. 9, as well as other instructions given to the
jury, will satisfy the Court that the jury was not permitted
to speculate. Subsections 2 and 3 of Instruction No. 9 are
as follows:
"2. If the impairment of earning is not permanent, then the computation of damage must be based
only on the period for which the temporary loss of
capacity is reasonably certain to continue.
"3. If the impairment of earning capacity is
permanent, then the period for computation of loss
would be the time that it could reasonably be anticipated plaintiff would be gainfully employed, which
might but may not necessarily be for the plaintiff's
full life expectancy."
In addition thereto, Instruction No. 10 charged the
jury as follows:
"You are further instructed that plaintiff is not
entitled to recover for any claimed injury or damage
which is of uncertain, speculative, or doubtful na·
ture. Therefore, if the plaintiff shall have failed tc
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prove any claimed injury or any claimed element of
damage by a preponderance of the evidence, or if
the evidence respecting any such matters is evenly
balanced, you must resolve such issue in favor of the
defendant.
"You are not allowed and must not speculate as
to the extent and nature of the plaintiff's injuries,
but if you find he· is entitled to damages, he should
be compensated only for those injuries which you
find from a preponderance of the evidence were directly and proximately a result of the accident complained of. A party is. not entitled to recover for
imaginary injuries or injuries of a type or nature
that are not a result of the accident or injury complained of."
The jury was not required to find a permanent impairment of earning capacity. It was. charged on what it should
do in the event that it determined from the evidence that
such impairment of earning capacity was permanent. The
jury was further charged that if the impairment of earnings was not permanent, then the computation of damages
must be based only on the period for which the temporary
loss of capacity was reasonably certain to continue. In Instruction No. 10, the jury was expressly charged to the
effect that it could not speculate as to the damages nor take
into account injuries of an uncertain or doubtful nature.
Defendants suggest that there is no documentary or
other evidence concerning plaintiff's life expectancy or
work expectancy. The only evidence which might properly
have been received, which was not received on the issue of
life expectancy, would be the mortality or life expectancy
tables. Plaintiff is aware of no rule which prevents the
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jury from determining from the evidence and in its own
sound discretion, the elements of damage in the absence of
life expectancy tables. In the last analysis, the question of
life expectancy and the period for which a plaintiff might
be gainfully employed, is within the sound judgment of the
jury, based upon the evidence in the case. If, as the defendants suggest, the jury was permitted to speculate with
respect to life expectancy and period of gainful employment, then such is the case in every trial wherein life expectancy and work expectancy data is not introduced.
The fact is that plaintiff endeavored to have the jury
charged with respect to the life expectancy of the plaintiff,
but such instruction was not given.
There is no serious doubt but what there is evidence
from which the jury could find that plaintiff sustained
permanent impairment of earnings and earning capacity.

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES.
There is no merit whatsoever to the contention by defendants that the Court's, instructions on damages were
unbalanced in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Defendants state that the Court's instructions on the
question of damages were contained in Instructions Nos. 8,
9, 10 and 13. This is incorrect. In addition to the Instructions Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 13, relating to damages, the matter
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of damages was covered in Instructions Nos. 11 and 12. Instruction No. 11 was in conformity with Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 11. Instruction No. 12 was for the
benefit of the defendants and in conformity with Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 14. Instruction No. 8 is
a general instruction on the question of damages, generally
recognized as being a correct and fair instruction as to the
law applicable to the issue of damages. There is certainly
no charge made in the said instruction which contains an
incorrect statement of the law. Instruction No. 9 deals
specifically with the question of impairm·ent of earning capacity. Said instruction contains a correct statement of the
law. Plaintiff submits that the instruction was as beneficial
to the defendants as to the plaintiff. Particularly, subparagraph 2 of the said instruction charged the jury on one
aspect of the defendants' theory of the case. Instruction No.
10 is, in its entirety, Defendants' Requested Instruction No.
13.
The first paragraph of Instruction No. 13 is practically
identical with the provisions of Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 12. The last paragraph of Instruction No. 13,
although not requested by defendants, correctly states the
law.
It is significant that no exception was taken by defendants to the Court's instructions, nor to the failure to give
Requested Instructions, except with respect to the giving
of Instruction No. 9.

Defendants can show no prejudice resulting to then1
from the instructions.
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CONCLUSION
The Respondent respectfully submits that the only real
question to be considered by the Court on this appeal is
whether there is ample evidence to support the verdict and
judgment. The record shows the evidence to be ample.
There is no showing of any passion or prejudice on the
part of the jury. The Court is called upon by the Appellant
to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. This, the
Court cannot and should not do. The judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
OORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Leonard J. Lewis,
Reed A. Watkins,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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